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1 
Thinking in Terms of Contract Defences? 
 
Andrew Dyson, James Goudkamp and Frederick Wilmot-Smith 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
While the terminology of defences is commonplace in other fields of private law, contract 
lawyers seem relatively unaccustomed to thinking in terms of defences. For example, 
although the leading texts in other areas of private law reserve a prominent place for 
defences,
1
 the present edition of Chitty on Contracts does not.
2
 Similarly, although Andrew 
Burrows dedicates Part 4 of his Restatement of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment to 
defences,
3
 he includes no equivalent section in his Restatement of the English Law of 
Contract. Indeed, references to ‘defences’ in that work are few and far between.4  
 Although it is true that the word ‘defence’ is used periodically in writing on contract law,5 
contract law scholars tend not to employ the concept of a defence in structuring their 
analyses, and they do not seem to attach particular significance to the term. They may even 
struggle to point with confidence to rules that count as defences. In his chapter in this 
volume, Kit Barker sums up the situation as follows:
6
  
 
Ask most lawyers to name defences in the criminal law, law or torts, or the law 
of unjust enrichments and they will readily be able to reel off a list with some 
confidence. Request from them instead a list of contractual defences and they 
will probably pause longer for thought. 
 
 The overarching aim of this chapter is to explore the reluctance of contract lawyers to 
think in terms of defences. The opposition to terminology that is ubiquitous elsewhere in 
private law is a striking feature of contract law scholarship that merits attention. The analysis 
is in three parts. In Section 2, we ask whether contract law has defences. We argue that, on 
three popular definitions of that term, there are defences to contract claims. This, combined 
with three further features, which we canvass in Section 3, explains specifically what is 
puzzling about the fact that contract lawyers do not think in terms of defences. Finally, in 
Section 4 we address the question whether contract lawyers ought to speak in terms of 
defences. As a precursor to this analysis, we isolate a range of related questions that can be 
asked about defences. Considerable confusion, we believe, has been nourished by a failure on 
the part of many theorists to be clear about the questions that they are asking. Having 
explained through a process of distinction the question with which we are concerned, we 
offer reasons for and against using the language of defences in the contractual context.  
 
                                                 
1
  Eg, A Dugdale (ed), Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 21st edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) ch 3 (entitled 
‘General Defences’); C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S Watterson (eds), Goff & Jones on Unjust Enrichment 8th 
edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) Pt 6 (entitled ‘Defences’). 
2
  H Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts, 32nd edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2015).  
3
  A Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2012).  
4
  A Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Contract (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016). The 
index does not even contain the term ‘defence’ as a main entry. 
5
  See, eg, Contributory Negligence as a Defence in Contract (Law Com No 219, 1993); Law Commission, 
The Illegality Defence (Law Com 320, 2010); Law Commission, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the 
Benefit of Third Parties (Law Com 242, 1996) para 10.2. 
6
  See ch 2 at p [xxx] [P.1]. 
2 
2. ARE THERE DEFENCES IN CONTRACT? 
 
One possible explanation for the dearth of references to defences in writings on contract law 
is simply that there are no defences to contract law claims. While this suggestion might seem 
surprising, it should not be dismissed out of hand. For example, in her chapter in an earlier 
volume in this series, Helen Scott ventures that the South African law of unjust enrichment 
may leave no room for defences because of the way in which the elements of the cause of 
action in unjust enrichment are defined.
7
 Whether contract law recognises defences depends 
on how the concept of a defence is understood.
8
 In this section we argue that, on three 
popular definitions of ‘defence’, there are several examples of contract law doctrines that 
answer to the description of a defence.
9
 The upshot is that the failure of contract law scholars 
to employ the concept of defences cannot be explained on the ground that there are no 
defences in the law of contract.  
 
2.1.  Defences as rules that are external to the elements of the cause of action 
 
In his chapter in Defences in Tort, Graham Virgo wrote that ‘[a] denial negates an element of 
the [claim], whereas a defence is a rule that relieves the defendant of liability where all the 
elements of the [claim] for which the claimant sues are present’.10 This analysis, which Kit 
Barker describes as ‘probably the most popular of modern academic conceptualisations of the 
idea of a “defence”’, offers a contrast with the concept of a denial.11 It explains defences in 
terms of a distinction between the ‘elements of the claim’ and those doctrines that are 
external to the claim, but which relieve the defendant, wholly or partly, of liability.
12
 
Proponents of this definition need to offer a full account of it. However, in this chapter, we 
assume that such an explanation can be given, and will adopt an intuitive, pre-theoretical 
notion to develop our own claims.  
 Many contract law doctrines seem to operate as denials. Barker writes:
13
  
 
If one understands a contractual cause of action as the set of facts both sufficient 
and necessary to meet the requirements of contractual inception doctrines (the 
‘elements’ of a binding contract) then … it is pretty clear that no argument 
                                                 
7
  H Scott, ‘Defence, Denial or Cause of Action: “Enrichment Owed” and the Absence of a Legal Ground’ in 
in A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-Smith (eds), Defences in Unjust Enrichment (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2016) 64. 
8
 Without clarifying the definition of the concept, there is a risk of a ‘merely verbal’ dispute: see generally D 
Chalmers, ‘Verbal Disputes’ (2011) 120(4) Philosophical Review 515. 
9
  We discuss the definition of defences at greater length in A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-Smith, 
‘Central Issues in the Law of Tort Defences’ in A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-Smith (eds), Defences 
in Tort (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2015) 5–11; A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-Smith, ‘Defences in 
Unjust Enrichment: Questions and Themes’ in A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-Smith (eds), Defences 
in Unjust Enrichment (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2016) 2–7. 
10
  G Virgo, ‘Justifying Necessity as a Defence in Tort Law’ A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-Smith (eds), 
Defences in Tort (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2015) 139.  
11
  Barker, ch 2, p …. For an assessment of this conception of a defence, see L Duarte d’Almeida, ‘Defining 
“Defences”’ in A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-Smith, Defences in Tort (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2015). Daniel Markovits uses this definition of the term defence in his contribution to this volume. He writes 
that ‘a party that seeks to avoid enforcement of boilerplate does not offer a defence against contractual 
obligation so much as directly deny that the boilerplate belongs in the contract to begin with’: Markovits, 
ch 3, p … [p.23]. 
12
  On some accounts, not every doctrine relieving the defendant of liability is a defence: this shows the 
possibility of further distinctions within the defence/denial group. 
13
  Barker, ch 2, p …. 
3 
concerning agreement, consideration, intention to create legal relations or 
uncertainty of terms is really a defence argument. 
 
All of these arguments assert that the preconditions of contractual validity are absent, and 
without a contract, an action for breach of contract cannot be established.  
 Nevertheless, at least some contract law doctrines seem to amount to defences in the sense 
currently under consideration. Consider, for example, limitation.
14
 It is not an element of the 
cause of action in breach of contract that no limitation bar applies. As Burrows observed in 
the context of tort defences, ‘no one has ever suggested that limitation should instead be 
viewed as specifying an element of the cause of action’.15 A plea that a limitation bar applies 
cannot, it follows, be a denial. Instead, a limitation bar prevents a claim from succeeding if 
the cause of action of action for breach of contract is fully constituted. Scholars analysing 
other compartments of the law of obligations routinely refer to limitation as a ‘defence’;16 
there is no reason to distinguish contract law in this respect. 
 Limitation is certainly not the only example of a contractual defence in the relevant sense 
of the word. The action for breach of contract is actionable per se; a claimant need not prove 
any loss for the claim to succeed. However, the defendant can seek to limit her liability for 
any loss that the claimant shows was caused by the defendant’s breach. Any such limiting 
doctrines can be thought of as defences, and arguably should be understood in this way.
17
 The 
doctrine of remoteness of damage is, for example, such a limiting rule,
18
 and in his chapter, 
V Niranjan claims that ‘remoteness … is an answer or defence to what is in any case a 
complete cause of action.’19 Much the same could be said about the contributory negligence 
doctrine.
20
 That rule is a damages-limiting device and, as such, can be understood as a 
defence on the defence/denial framework. It is no part of the cause of action in breach of 
contract that the claimant took reasonable care of her own interests.
21
  
 Many other doctrines, including rules that are typically thought of as being central to the 
law of contract, are arguably defences too on the meaning of that term that is presently in 
issue. Consider the doctrine of undue influence, which is discussed by Stephen Waddams in 
                                                 
14
  Limitation Act 1980 (UK) ss 5–7. Compare Duarte d’Almeida (n 11) 51–2 (arguing that limitation is a 
procedural bar, not a defence). 
15
  A Burrows, ‘Some Recurring Issues in relation to Limitation of Actions’ in A Dyson, J Goudkamp and 
F Wilmot-Smith (eds), Defences in Tort (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2015) 310. 
16
  See, eg, N McBride and R Bagshaw, Tort Law 5th edn (2015, Harlow, Pearson Education) (treating 
limitation within ch 26, which is entitled ‘Defences’); Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson (n 1) (addressing 
limitation within a part of the book that is headed ‘Defences’).  
17
  Some writers deny that rules that affect only the remedy are defences: see, eg, J Goudkamp, Tort Law 
Defences (rev ed, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2016) 2. An intermediate position was adopted by the Law 
Commission in its report Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefits of Third Parties: Law Commission 
(n 5) para 10.2. The Commission wrote that: ‘we do not include as defences matters which bar a particular 
remedy such as that specific performance is not available of a contract for personal service.’ 
18
  Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex 341; 156 ER 145; Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (The 
Achilleas) [2008] UKHL 48; [2009] 1 AC 61. 
19
  Niranjan ch 10, p …. 
20
  Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (UK) s 1.  
21
  It has periodically been suggested (or held) that the contributory negligence doctrine can reduce damages to 
nil: see, eg, McMullen v National Coal Board [1982] ICR 148 (QBD); Jayes v IMI (Kynoch) Ltd [1984] 
EWCA Civ 4; [1985] ICR 155, 159; McEwan v Lothian Buses plc 2006 CSOH 56; 2006 SCLR 592, [32]–
[35]; Byron Avenue [2010] NZCA 65; [2010] 3 NZLR 445, [63]; cf Wynbergen v Hoyts Corp Pty Ltd (1997) 
72 ALJR 65 (HCA); Anderson v Newham College of Further Education [2002] EWCA Civ 505; [2003] ICR 
212; Buyukardicli v Hammerson UK Properties plc [2002] EWCA Civ 683 [7]. Where the doctrine has his 
consequence, it is difficult to see it other than as a defence: it completely eliminates the obligation to pay 
damages, but on no view does it suggest that there was no wrong.  
4 
his chapter.
22
 The absence of undue influence does not seem to be a part of the cause of 
action in breach of contract, yet the doctrine can be used to avoid a contract—and, so, to 
resist an action for breach of contract.
23
 As such, it is arguably a defence. Waddams writes: 
‘From one point of view the use of such a power may be regarded as a defence to contractual 
obligation’.24 The doctrines of duress and misrepresentation might be similarly understood: 
the absence of duress and misrepresentation do not seem to be part of the cause of action in 
breach of contract; yet the doctrines can be raised to resist an action for breach. Substantially 
the same points can be made in relation to the illegality doctrine.
25
 The absence of illegality is 
not usually cited as part of the cause of action in breach of contract. To this extent, the 
doctrine appears to be a defence. 
 
2.2.  Rules external to the cause of action that must be pleaded by the defendant  
 
Robert Stevens claims that the first definition of a defence is satisfactory only when coupled 
with a rider. He writes: ‘Anything that the defendant pleads which can resist the claimant’s 
action, that does not merely constitute a denial of an element of the claim, is a defence.’26 
Applying this definition, Stevens argues that the doctrine of waiver is a defence.
27
 Limitation 
is also is a defence in this sense of the word. The rules governing limitation are external to 
those that specify the scope of the action in breach of contract, and the defendant carries the 
onus of pleading limitation (although once put in issue, it falls to the claimant to prove that 
the bar does not apply.
28
) Another defence on this definition is contributory negligence.
29
 We 
have already noted that the contributory negligence doctrine is not part of the cause of action 
in breach of contract,
30
 and it is well-established that the defendant must plead it.
31
 A final 
illustration is the mitigation doctrine. It is an external rule in respect of which the defendant 
bears the onus of pleading.
32
  
 While all rules that are defences on the first definition of that term that we have canvassed 
are also defences on Stevens’s definition, the converse is not true. Illegality would seem to be 
a defence on the first definition,
33
 but it cannot be on Stevens’s meaning of that word: it is 
unnecessary for the defendant to plead it.
34
 The court is permitted, perhaps required, to 
consider the doctrine provided that it emerges on the evidence that the preconditions for its 
application are satisfied.
35
  
 
                                                 
22
  Waddams, ch 4. 
23
  For discussion of whether undue influence is a defence, see S Waddams p 000 [‘From one point of view the 
use of such a power may be regarded as a defence to contractual obligation’] 
24
  Waddams, ch 4. 
25
  The illegality doctrine is addressed by Lord Toulson in his chapter: see ch ….  
26
  R Stevens, ‘Should Contributory Fault be Analogue or Digital?’ in A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-
Smith (eds), Defences in Tort (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2015) 246. See also Stevens’s chapter in this 
volume: ch 7, p … (‘In private law, a defence is a reason that the defendant must assert in his pleadings that 
will defeat an otherwise good claim’).  
27
  ‘Generally therefore, waiver operates as a defence to a claim that would otherwise succeed’: Stevens, ch 7, p 
….  
28
  See Burrows (n 16) 310. 
29
  Expressly stated in Stevens (n 26) 244–48. 
30
  See the text accompanying n 20. 
31
  Fookes v Slaytor [1978] 1 WLR 1293 (CA). 
32
  Anselm v Buckle [2014] EWCA Civ 311 [24] (Briggs LJ). 
33
  See the text accompanying n 25. 
34
  Lipton v Powell [1921] 2 KB 51 (Div Ct); Ferguson v John Dawson & Partners (Contractors) Ltd [1976] 3 
All ER 817, 821; [1976] 1 WLR 1213 (CA) 1218; Pickering v Deacon [2003] EWCA Civ 554; The Times, 
19 April 2003.  
35
  As to these preconditions, see, now, Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42.  
5 
2.3.  Pleading and proof definition 
 
Other writers understand the way in which the onus of proof has been allocated in respect of 
a given rule to indicate whether the rule concerned is a defence. This yields a third popular 
definition of the term ‘defence’. This definition does not incorporate within it the distinction 
between a denial of the element so the action in which the claimant sues and rules that are 
external to those elements.
36
 It is hence quite separate from the definitions considered thus 
far. Tony Weir embraced this third definition of the term ‘defence’ when he asserted that the 
contributory negligence doctrine is ‘unquestionably a defence … [since] it is for the 
defendant to plead and prove it’.37 There are many other contract law doctrines that are 
defences on this definition. Because the onuses of pleading and proof usually go hand in 
hand,
38
 and rules in respect of which the defendant carries an onus of pleading must usually 
also be proved by the defendant.
39
 It follows that most rules that are defences on Stevens’s 
definition are also defences on this third definition.  
 
2.4.  Summary 
 
In this section, we have canvassed three popular definitions of defences in private law. We 
have also shown that on all of these definitions, there are defences in contract law.  
 
3. THE PUZZLE OF CONTRACT DEFENCES 
 
The preceding section demonstrated that there are doctrines in contract law which could be 
analysed as defences, regardless of how that word is understood. In view of this, coupled with 
the fact that the language of defences is ubiquitous in other branches of private law, it is 
curious that contract law scholars shun the term. In this section, we give three additional 
reasons why the relative absence of the concept of a defence in contract law scholarship is 
puzzling. 
 
3.1.  Similar terminology for similar doctrines 
 
It has forcefully been argued that we should discuss rules that share the same or a similar 
logical form in a unitary lexicon, regardless of the historical or jurisdictional pedigree of 
those rules. This proposition is particularly prominent in debates over the distinction between 
legal and equitable rules. For example, Andrew Burrows, a leading exponent of this way of 
thinking, argues that ‘lawyers are not doing enough to eradicate the needless differences in 
terminology used, and the substantive inconsistences, between common law and equity.’40 
Burrows’ argument typifies the view, widely held, that rules of the same form should be 
discussed in a common language, regardless of their origin in the law of obligations. This 
deepens the puzzle with which we are concerned. As we have shown, contract law has 
various doctrines which could be called defences. Furthermore, some of these doctrines, like 
                                                 
36
  Compare Duarte d’Almeida (n 11), who explains the distinction between defences and denials in terms of 
probative burdens.  
37
  T Weir, Introduction to Tort Law, 2nd ed (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2006) 129. It should be noted that Weir 
seems to think that the burden of proof is important when it comes to ascertaining whether a rule is a 
defence. This view is not shared by Stevens, who focuses on the burden of pleading.  
38
  Semper necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui agit (he who asserts must prove).  
39
  As Weir observes, the defendant carries the onus of proof in in relation to contributory negligence: Wakelin v 
L & SW Rly (1886) 12 App Cas 41 (HL) 47 (Lord Watson); SS Heranger (Owners) v SS Diamond (Owners) 
[1939] AC 94 (HL) 104 (Lord Wright). 
40
  A Burrows ‘We Do This At Common Law But That In Equity’ (2002) 22 OJLS 1, 1. 
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limitation, Burrows himself even calls defences in writing about other areas of the law.
41
 
Nevertheless, scholars, often seem to resist linguistic assimilation of these doctrines in their 
writing on contract law.
42
 In the absence of explanation, this resistance to invoking in the law 
of contract language that is used freely elsewhere in the law of obligations is puzzling.  
 
3.2.  Statutory recognition of defences 
 
Another reason why it is surprising that lawyers do not think about contract doctrine with the 
concept of a defence is that certain features of the law require them to do so. When a third-
party beneficiary brings proceedings to enforce a contract, a promisor has a statutory 
entitlement to certain defences she would have had against the promisee.
43
 For example, 
section 3(3)(b) of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (UK) provides that  
 
[t]he promisor shall also have available to him by way of defence or set-off any 
matter if … it would have been available to him by way of defence or set-off if 
the proceedings had been brought by the promisee. 
 
This provision mandates the use of the terminology of defences, and requires the parameters 
of the term ‘defence’ to be identified. The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 is not 
the only piece of legislation that is concerned with contract law that utilises the concept of 
defences.
44
  
 
3.3.  Use of concept of defence in theoretical discussions 
 
The final reason that contract law scholars’ failure to invoke the language of defences is 
surprising is that legal theorists use the concept in thinking about the law of contract.
45
 In 
Contract Theory, Stephen Smith invokes the terminology of defences. He applies it to a 
variety of doctrines including duress, unconscionability, mistake, frustration and estoppel.
46
 
Further, although HLA Hart’s most famous writing in special jurisprudence is perhaps his 
treatment of the criminal law,
47
 his earliest published essay, which introduced legal 
philosophers to the concept of defeasibility, concerned defences in contract.
48
 Borrowing 
from the law of real property, Hart illustrated the ‘defeasible character of legal concepts’ in 
the contractual context.
49
 He explained:
50
 
 
When the student has learnt that in English law there are positive conditions 
required for the existence of a valid contract, i.e., at least two parties, an offer by 
one, acceptance by the other, [etc.] his understanding of the legal concept of a 
contract is still incomplete … For these conditions, although necessary, are not 
                                                 
41
  See the sources mentioned in n 16.  
42
  See the text accompanying nn 3–4. 
43
  Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (UK) s 3. 
44
  See, eg, Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 (UK) s 2(3)–(4).  
45
  See, further, PS Atiyah, ‘Contract and Fair Exchange’ in his Essays on Contract (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 1986) 329 
46
  S Smith, Contract Theory (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), esp ch 9. 
47
  Especially on account of his Punishment and Responsibility 2nd edn, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968).  
48
  HLA Hart, ‘The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights’ (1948–9) 49 Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 171, also in AGN Flew (ed), Logic and Language (first series, Oxford, Blackwell, 1951). Hart later 
disowned the paper: Hart (n 47) v. 
49
  Hart (1948–9) (n 48) 181. 
50
  ibid, 174–75 (emphasis in original) 
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always sufficient and he has still to learn what can defeat a claim that there is a 
valid contract, even though all these conditions are satisfied. 
 
These defeating factors are, Hart says, defences to claims in contract. He went on to list a 
number of defences in contract law, including duress, insanity, intoxication and frustration, 
which he classified into seven distinct categories.
51
 The essay has spawned a vast 
philosophical literature on ‘defeasibility’.52  
 The reluctance of the authors of leading treatises on the law of contract to organise and 
discuss contract law in terms of defences thus appears out-of-step with some of theoretical 
literature on contract. This is not attributable simply to a lack of awareness of this 
philosophical literature: both Hart’s paper and Smith’s book are very well known and widely 
discussed. Not only does mainstream writing regarding contract law depart from the 
theoretical literature to which we have referred, but the difference in approach is unexplained.  
 
4. SHOULD CONTRACT LAWYERS THINK IN TERMS OF DEFENCES? 
 
We have suggested that the absence of the concept of defences from doctrinal scholarship on 
contract law is, at least at first glance, puzzling. In this section we ask, first, whether the 
asymmetry with other areas of the law of obligations is justifiable; we ask, next, what 
advantages there might be in thinking of contract law using the concept of a defence. Before 
we turn to this, we attempt to clarify the precise question we are asking. It is important that 
we do so, for much of the literature regarding the defences, in private law and beyond, fails to 
isolate the exact question that is being addressed.  
 
4.1.   Clarifying the question 
 
To create a contract, it is usually sufficient that there be offer and acceptance, consideration 
and an intention to create legal relations. If, however, there is a fundamental change in 
circumstances such as to render performance ‘radically different from that which was 
undertaken by the contract’, the contract is frustrated.53 Let us, for now, prescind from 
whether the doctrine of frustration is a ‘defence’; we can, instead, call it an ‘exception’ to a 
more general rule. Very many legal doctrines seem to take the form of exceptions in this 
sense. We should distinguish at least six questions that arise; our question in this section is 
the sixth.  
 Two questions that can be asked about a specific exception, like frustration, are as follows. 
We might ask, first, what the law is on the matter. This requires an analysis of the relevant 
doctrinal materials. What does ‘radically different’ mean? Does frustration occur 
automatically?
54
 And so on. Next, we might ask whether the relevant law, whatever it may 
be, is justified. Is it right that the law excuses the parties from further performance when there 
are radical changes in circumstances? Or should the parties bear the risk of prejudice from 
these shifts?  
 Particular exceptions can be categorised within a broader class of doctrines. A third 
question we can ask, then, is whether the exception in question is a token instance of some 
                                                 
51
  Ibid, 175–76. 
52
  For an overview of some of the key debates, see JF Beltrán and GB Ratti (eds), The Logic of Legal 
Requirements: Essays on Defeasibility (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012). For a book building a 
theory of defeasibility and defences out of Hart’s essay, L Duarte d’Almeida, Allowing for Exceptions: A 
Theory of Defences and Defeasibility in Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015). 
53
  Davis Contractors v Fareham Urban DC [1956] AC 696 (HL) 728 (Lord Radcliffe). 
54
  As to which, see Ewan McKendrick’s chapter: ch 8.  
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more abstract type. This is the sort of question which people address when they ask whether 
contract law has defences: a category of ‘defences’ is posited, and it is asked whether some 
particular doctrine (such as frustration) belongs within that category. There are numerous 
(mutually consistent) possible classifications that can be discussed. Frustration might be 
(along with duress and undue influence, for example) within the more abstract category of 
‘doctrines which can cancel valid contracts’ and (along with common mistake, for instance) 
within the more abstract category of ‘doctrines which deal with circumstances being radically 
different from that expected.’ We can also discuss which of these arrangements is most 
enlightening; this might vary, depending on one’s purposes.  
 In proposing an answer to this third question, a more abstract category than the particular 
exception must be put forward. We can then ask, fourth, whether the law should recognise 
exceptions of the type gathered together by this category; most abstractly we can ask, as 
Richard Epstein does, ‘why it is necessary to think of exceptions to the general proposition at 
all’.55 Scholars often ask what reasons there are to recognise defences.56 This is another way 
of asking the fourth question. A danger of asking it in this way is that the term ‘defence’ is 
used in various ways by different authors.
57
 However, if a clear answer is given to the third 
question, this will clarify the sense of ‘defence’ in question. The fourth question differs from 
the second question: the second question is about a particular doctrine, and so might point to 
quite particular features of that doctrine; the fourth question is about a more abstract 
category, so answers must draw on more general features shared by all members of the set.  
 The fifth question we can ask is what, if anything, we can learn from the fact that some 
doctrine is within a more general category. It might be thought, for instance, that the 
classification of some doctrine as a defence can have practical implications. For example, in 
his chapter Daniel Markovits writes that 
 
the doctrinal distinction between a defence against and a direct denial of contract 
liability, although largely rhetorical when stated as a matter of general theory, can 
make a difference to outcomes when embedded in a particular sphere of 
commercial and legal practice.
58
 
 
Some have argued, more concretely, that quite general practical consequences can flow from 
the classification of some doctrine as a defence. A good illustration is found in Robert 
Stevens’s work. He writes that ‘[t]he most important practical effect of characterising an 
issue as being a defence is that it will usually determine who has to prove what as a matter of 
evidence’.59  
                                                 
55
  RA Epstein, ‘Pleadings and Presumptions’ (1973) 40 University of Chicago Law Review 556, 558. 
56
  See, eg, ibid (arguing that defences can be used to structure legal argument and clarify difficult issues of 
law); RA Epstein, ‘Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints’ (1979) 8 Journal of 
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Enrichment’ in C Mitchell and W Swadling (eds), The Restatement Third, Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment: Comparative and Critical Essays (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013) (suggesting five possible 
reasons for recognising defences in the law of unjust enrichment and rejecting several others). 
57
  We sketched three definitions above in Section 2. That list is not exhaustive.  
58
 Markovits, ch 3, 000. 
59
  Stevens (n 26) 250. 
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 These arguments do not seem to be concerned with whether some particular category of 
exceptions should exist, or how we should categorise those exceptions; they are concerned 
with what follows from that categorisation. Arguments of this type, while popular, are 
controversial. For example, it might be thought that all of the ‘consequences’ of 
characterising a doctrine as a defence are in fact constituents of the definition.
60
  
 The success of such practical arguments may also depend on whether concept of a defence 
is internal to the law or merely an analytic device for thinking about the law. On one view, 
the concept of a defence is part of the positive law.
61
 The idea here is that the law, rightly or 
wrongly, embraces the idea of a defence. For example, if defences are understood in 
contradistinction to denials,
62
 the claim is that the law itself classifies rules as either denials 
or defences based on an organisational divide found within the law. This may be John 
Gardner’s position. Of the distinction between offences and defences in criminal law, he asks 
‘what line is it that … legal systems … are trying to draw?’63 It might be argued that the law 
should not be arranged in this way. Perhaps the divide between denial and defences is 
incoherent; and, even if it is not, perhaps the law does not draw the line in the right place. 
However, on this first view, this would be irrelevant to a description of the law: there is a 
line, and it is drawn by the law itself.
64
  
 Another view is that the concept of a defence is one that we use merely to think about the 
law (or, at least, about certain branches of the law). The law might be such that a claimant 
can establish liability only by proving a certain set of facts, and the defendant can resist that 
liability only by proving some other set of facts. However, this view claims, once we know 
all the facts about when liability arises, how it might be defeated, who bears the burden or 
pleading and proof, and so on, we know everything salient that there is to know about the 
law. There is, in other words, no further question about whether some of these rules are 
classified as a defence by the law.
65
 Scholars and judges might refer to certain rules as 
defences but, on this alternative way of understanding things, such references are nothing 
more than an exegetical tool: perhaps the label ‘defence’ is a shorthand for rules in respect of 
which the defendant bears the burden of proof, for example.  
 For our purposes, the relevance of this distinction is this. If the classification of some 
doctrine as a defence is internal to the law, it may be that the law attaches consequences to 
that classification. If, however, the concept is merely an analytical device for thinking about 
the law, it is less clear that inferences can be drawn from the classification of a doctrine as a 
defence.
66
 
It is possible to ask and answer any of these five questions without employing the 
language of defences; indeed, contract lawyers seem to do so already. The puzzle we have 
                                                 
60
  For development of this analysis, see Dyson, Goudkamp and Wilmot-Smith (n 9) 5–6. 
61
  Goudkamp (n 17) xvii. 
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  See section 2.1.  
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  J Gardner, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford, Oxford 
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64
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Oxford University Press, 2012) ch 5.  
65
  Consider our example of the legal rule, ‘PQ unless r’, and the category of which r is a token, C. On both 
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sufficiently related. Yet, on the first view, one of those features is the law’s classification ‘r is part of C’; on 
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66
  It is important to be quite precise here about what we mean. On this view, the classification of some doctrine 
as a defence is a conclusion we draw from various characteristics of legal doctrine—for example, from the 
rules of pleading and proof. We do not suggest that no further consequences should follow from the nature of 
legal rules on pleading and proof, only that the classification of those rules as a defence adds nothing to such 
an argument.  
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isolated does not, therefore, seem to concern any of these questions. Instead, it seems to 
concern a sixth question: what value is there in thinking about some abstract category of 
exceptions using the language or terminology of ‘defences’? This question is not about 
whether some particular exception, like frustration, or class of exceptions, such as those often 
designated with the label of ‘defences’, should be recognised. The question, instead, is about 
the way we talk about those rules and categories. As we have illustrated, we might discuss 
these areas of law using the language of ‘exceptions’; we could discuss them, instead, using a 
foreign language or even an idealised, formal language;
67
 why, then, discuss the law using the 
language of ‘defences’? 
   
4.2.  The value of the language of ‘defences’ 
 
The concepts we use are sometimes thought to be important if we are to describe reality 
correctly. For example, Theodore Sider writes that ‘[f]or a representation to be fully 
successful, truth is not enough; the representation must also use the right concepts, so that its 
conceptual structure matches reality’s structure.’68 Similarly, in the legal context, Ernest 
Weinrib writes that a theoretical account of the law should ‘orient itself to the features salient 
in legal experience’ and seeks to ‘understand those (and other) features as they are 
understood from within the law.’69 These claims suggest that legal scholars who are 
concerned to describe the law should use the law’s concepts.  
 Even if what Weinrib claims here is true, it would not follow that contract lawyers need to 
invoke the terminology of defences. It is entirely possible to grasp the concept of a defence 
(regardless of the definition that one embraces) without using the word ‘defence’. The 
question here is: What would be wrong, for example, with an account of contract law, 
including defences, expressed in (say) a formalised language? One possible answer to this 
question is that, although nothing is intrinsically wrong with such an account, it may be 
harder for some people to understand than an account in natural language. A key concern for 
most people writing about the law is how best to articulate the claims about the law. For 
example, a textbook writer must be alive to her audience: construction lawyers might find it 
helpful to place certain rules front and centre which shipping lawyers can relegate to a 
footnote. In the context of the present volume, one might hypothesise, therefore, that contract 
lawyers are disinclined to use the language of defences because they consider that it does not 
help people understand the content of contract law.
70
 
 This analysis pushes the question back one level: why do contract lawyers find the 
language of defences less useful than scholars of other areas of law? As we have shown, the 
language of defences could be applied to large swathes of contract law.
71
 Why is it harder (if, 
indeed, it is) to describe contract law using the terminology of defences than, for example, 
tort law and unjust enrichment law? One possible answer to this question is that contract law, 
unlike many other fields, does not make use of certain distinctions within the concept of a 
defence, such that that between justifications and excuses. Thus, these latter concepts are 
                                                 
67
  We could, for example, discuss some rule as ‘PQ unless r’, where ‘P’ is the set of circumstances 
defeasibly sufficient to yield a legal conclusion (‘Q’), and ‘r’ is the exception to that rule; we could then ask 
in virtue of what r is a member of some broader set of exceptions, C. And so on. 
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  T Sider, Writing the Book of the World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) vii. 
69
  EJ Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1995) 11. 
70
  We consider below whether the concept of a defence is internal to the law, such that a perfect presentation of 
the law would require the use of the concept. 
71
  See section 2.  
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widely thought by criminal law scholars to be of profound significance for their subject.
72
 
Similarly, torts scholars have also suggested that the difference between the ideas of 
justification and excuse is important for their discipline.
73
 Conversely, few contract scholars 
have made much of them when discussing contract law.
74
 There are, it is true, innumerable 
references in the case law and literature to contracting parties being ‘excused’ from their 
obligations, for example subsequent to the contract becoming impossible to perform.
75
 In 
these cases, however, the term ‘excuse’ is not being used in contrast with that of 
‘justification’; it is being used to denote the parties’ release from their obligations. If the 
language of defences is useful as a tool for making this further distinction, and if contract law 
has no use for the distinction, that would show why the term is less valuable to contract 
lawyers. Notably, however, unjust enrichment lawyers make use of the language of 
‘defences’ and few have thought about those doctrines in terms of justifications and 
excuses.
76
  
 A second answer to the question ‘why do contract lawyers find the language of defences 
less useful than scholars of other areas of law?’ may rest on convention: because judges do 
not use the language of defences in deciding contractual claims, it may not be illuminating to 
introduce what is essentially a foreign term into the discourse.
77
 Now this does not, of course, 
explain why judges do not employ the terminology of defences. But that is not to the point; 
the mere fact that, for whatever reason, judges eschew the language of defences in the 
contractual context may provide some reason not to use the term ‘defence’ in expositions of 
contract law.  
We have, so far, suggested reasons that contract lawyers might have to avoid the term 
‘defence’. Would there be any value in their using the language of defences? We here suggest 
two considerations: first, to illuminate links with doctrines both within contract law and 
between contract law and other parts of private law; second, to express moral features of the 
law. We have already considered the first reason.
78
 The idea we addressed is that rules that 
share the same or a similar logical form should be treated in a unitary lexicon, regardless of 
their historical or jurisdictional pedigree. It might be argued that the language of defences 
will enable similar links to be drawn within contract law and between contract law and other 
areas of law.  
This virtue, if it is a virtue, must be balanced against a possible disadvantage to employing 
the language of defences. While the language may make it easier for certain distinctions to be 
                                                 
72
  For instance, HLA Hart asserted that ‘the distinction between [justification and excuse] is . . . of great moral 
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75
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Wilmot-Smith (eds), Defences in Unjust Enrichment (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2016). 
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  Another hypothesis could be drawn from Barker, ch 2 p … [‘when the idea that a contractual cause of action 
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grasped, it might occlude others. To see what we have in mind, consider the doctrines of 
common mistake and frustration. Common mistake operates where the requirements of offer 
and acceptance are satisfied, but the parties have dealt with one another on the basis of a 
shared false assumption. If the mistake is sufficiently important, no contractual rights arise.
79
 
Frustration is distinguished from common mistake only by the moment in time when the 
assumption is falsified.
80
 Frustration deals with cases where the event arises after the contract 
has been formed. The parties’ contract is cancelled.81 Given that the only distinction between 
these doctrines is the time when the frustrating event occurs, contract scholars ought to treat 
their rules together. 
 However, it could be difficult to treat these rules together if the law is presented using the 
language of defences. Consider the denials/defences model of defences.
82
 Common mistake 
prevents a contract from ever having existed, and as such might be more amenable to being 
analysed as a denial: if there is no contract, there can be no breach. This may explain why 
Chitty deals with common mistake in its section on ‘Formation of the Contract.’83 
Conversely, the doctrine of frustration is easier to analyse as external to the elements of the 
action in breach of contract: it does not deny that there was a contract, but asserts that the 
contract has been cancelled. We are not, of course, suggesting that common mistake should 
be understood as a denial and frustration as a defence. Neither are we contending that the 
association between frustration and common mistake cannot be captured on certain views of 
defences. Our point is that invoking the language of defences might result in two rules that 
are related in some fundamental way being discussed, and perhaps even classified, separately, 
to the detriment of understanding regarding them.
84
 
 The second consideration we want to propose is that some moral features of the law might 
be missed if the language of defences is eschewed. In particular, the law’s assessment of the 
moral character of certain acts might be overlooked. To understand what we have in mind 
here, it is important to distinguish the content of a legal rule from its moral implications. The 
precise same legal rule, or set of legal rules, can be more or less defensible depending on the 
language with which they are expressed. Consider, for example, the movement to recognise 
same-sex marriage: for many, an equivalent set of legal rules under the label of a ‘civil 
partnership’ would fail to treat same-sex partners in the same way as heterosexual partners. 
This suggests that the language used to create or discuss some legal rule can have moral 
implications: the implication of ‘civil partnership’ was widely thought to be an assessment 
that same-sex relations were qualitatively different from heterosexual relations even though 
they were accorded the same substantive legal rights.  
If the language of defences carries with it moral connotations, we might have moral 
reasons to use (or avoid) this language. Consider John Gardner’s claim that the 
‘consequences [of the contrast between offences and defences] extend not only to the 
                                                 
79
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organization of textbooks but also to the moral quality of the criminal law.’85 He explains: ‘In 
classifying some action as criminal, the law asserts that there are prima facie reasons against 
its performance—indeed reasons sufficient to make its performance prima facie wrongful.’86 
A prima facie wrong, for Gardner, is ‘an actual wrong, not just an apparent or putative 
wrong.’87 Defences are doctrines permitting the defendant, who has done something prima 
facie wrongful, to explain why she did it; she might, for example, be excused or justified in 
her wrongful act. The classification of some particular doctrine as an offence or defence, 
therefore, makes a moral claim about the character of the action-types in question. In that 
respect, Gardner’s claims might concern earlier questions, about the justification of certain 
exceptions or categories of law. However, if the language of ‘defences’ implicates that the 
defendant has something to answer for—that they have done something prima facie wrong—
then there may be a further question about how we should talk about particular rules of law. 
If talking of certain doctrines as ‘defences’ to breach of contract accepts that a wrong was 
committed, but seeks to explain the wrongdoing, we might want to restrict the language of 
defences to those doctrines where that is, normatively, the fact of the matter; in particular, we 
would want to restrict the language to those situations where we wish to convey the sense that 
defendants invoking the doctrine have something to answer for. 
These remarks bear on a prominent debate in the contract theory literature, in particular 
the extent to which any breach of contract is, in truth, a wrong. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr 
famously pronounced that ‘[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction 
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it––and nothing else.’88 If this view is taken 
seriously, the language of defences should be avoided entirely in the contract context.
89
 Even 
if we resist the extent of Holmes’s claim,90 the justification of using the language of defences 
arises for individual doctrines. Consider frustration again. Suppose that an opera singer 
agrees to perform at an impresario’s house during the course of a new production. The singer 
becomes ill and is unable to perform; the impresario replaces her and claims damages from 
the singer.
91
 If the singer has a ‘defence’ of frustration, this might be thought to suggest that 
she has done something prima facie wrong, which requires justification. Whether she has 
done something prima facie wrong depends upon an independent theory of contractual 
obligation; our point here is that it might be thought important for the law to reflect the moral 
status of her action in its labelling of particular doctrines.
92
  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to probe the resistance of contract lawyers to using the 
language of defences. By demonstrating that contract law clearly admits of numerous rules 
that answer to at least one of three popular definitions of the concept of a defence, we have 
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shown that the resistance is real rather than apparent. Contract law undoubtedly has myriad 
doctrines that qualify as defences. This raises a puzzle–why are contract lawyers disinclined 
to think in terms of defences?–to which we drew attention. We endeavoured to explain 
exactly why this puzzle arises. Finally, we identified reasons for and against using the 
language of defences. The ideas that we canvass in this last section are controversial. They 
are also far from fully developed, and intentionally so. This is because the puzzle with which 
this chapter engaged has gone unaddressed to date, and in these circumstances, we have 
sought merely to isolate some possible lines of reasoning for future development.  
